Introduction
The First International Conference on Cognitive Technology (CT'95, Hong Kong, 1995) explored a radically new way of thinking about the impact computer technology has on humans, especially on the human mind. Our main aim at that time was a consideration of these effects with respect to rendering the interface between people and computers more humane. And we exemplified our approach by pointing to existing trends and tendencies in the vast new loosely organized field of research often refared to as 'HCI' ('Human Computer Interaction; the replacement for the politically and factually "incorrect" MMI, 'Man Machine Interface').
Current trends in HCI

Recent approaches to design in Human Computer
Interaction, in particular those of Cognitive Engineering ( [55] , [58] , [73] ) Cognitive Ergonomics ( [7] , [64] ), and Engineering Psychology ( [71] , [67] ), stress the need for tool designs which are characterized by interfaces which facilitate better user comprehension of the full effacts of their actions on application systems. The goal is to optimize the coupling d system performed and user performed tasks during complex problem solving. In attempting to adapt technological equipment and environments to people, the emphasis has been on using the psychological profiles of users to determine design flaws in order to understand why particular problems in user-tool interactions occur. It has been assumed tk success in achieving this understanding will lead to mc effective HCI design processes which are able to tar$ those tasks that map primarily to human cognitive a physical capabilities. The intention has been to incres overall system performance by eliminating the dissonan between natural human capability and the demands technologically mediated activity. Consequently, the approaches assume that human cognition is establish as the basis fiom which technological progress launched.
Cognition oriented approaches to HCI research a development have led to a large number af informati technology applications which feel good and comfortable to use. However, such approaches genera fail to adequately integrate directly into the design procl a consideration of the negative and undesirable short a long term effects these technologies may have on huma It is not unreasonable to postulate that the greater ' hctional rewards offered by using modern, compu mediated tools, the greater the cost in impact we humans are likely to pay. These costs have been noted several researchers (e.g., [2] [6 [65] , [66] , [68] , [69] , [72] 
Humane approach to tool design
By contrast to the above mentioned trends in HCI, a truly humane approach to tool design must take as its driving force real human need. It must take into consideration the processes (both physical and cognitive) by which humans adapt to environments. Thus, the focus of design needs to be reversed. Technology must be developed to enhance human capabilities rather than human capabilities used to condition and inform technological development. The differences between these points of departure are summarized in table 2.
Current Advances in CT
Cognitive Technology, despite its being a 'young' discipline, has already made a fkv important claims in the domain usually described as 'HCI'. By putting the computer in its place, a human, humanized, and necessarily humanizable tool, it simultaneously has put the human user in charge, and the interactional horse before the technological cart. In this section, we provide examples of this approach in theory-informed applications within a variety of areas in which C T has had an impact. These include the augmentation of human cognitive potential, the alleviation of human impairments and handicaps, and interactive leaming. ([SI) providing an appropriate interactive telecommunication service which allows the hearing impaired access to information networks, and a vibrotactile stimulation device ( [48] ) for teaching linguistically impaired adults to better express themselves. This latter device can easily be adopted to the leaming of foreign languages.
Cognitive Technology
Interactive Learning
A domain which invites little dispute with regard to the use d technologies producing desirable mind change is education. At the Institute h r the Learning Sciences at Northwestem University, USA, in collaboration with the University of Chicago, research into and development of computer teaching aids, so-called 'goal-based scenarios' (GBS) ([62] ) or 'leaming support systems for interactions with simulated characters' (Casper) ( [37] ), have focused on restoring students' desire fbr eff'ective learning by creating environments interesting enough to prompt good questions ( [61] ). At both Yale and John Hopkins Universities, USA, planning aids have been implemented that collaborate with humans in mixed-initiative planning and expert decision making, respectively ([5 1, [32] ). These systems fall into the C T paradigm because they simulate real life experiences in ways which channel users' attention to purposely made-salient environmental cues that positively affect the cognitive processes of 
Technology as a tool for the scient@c study mind of tl
Studying human computer interaction may help explain how human cognition works. Hermann et.
( [33] ) have been studying how reminding devices a€fi people who use them to keep their appointments. Patter observed in their experimental data may shed light how the memory of intention in humans is organized.
Cognitive regression
While the augmentation of cognition by means technology can find concrete expression in the c m t products of design, a technology induced regression cognition can only be demonstrated by means of metho carefully designed to uncover the true nature of t integrative processes which occur at the interface of t physical with the mental.
In this connection, progress to date has or been noticeable in research which has brought attention a large number of perceivable inter-and intra-persol behavioral "symptoms" (listed in 
Towards a unified theory of adaptation
The issues pertaining to the products d design cannot be considered disjointedly h m the processes by which design occurs. Rather, one is always informed by the other. This particular interrelationship comes about due to the dialectic nature of the adaptive process ( [49] , [25] Our primary concem is thus with the identification, mapping, and evaluation of the relationship between technological products and the processes by which our cognitive structures adapt through exposure to the heuristics goveming the highly ordered information structures of an intensely technological environment. a particular interest to us is how the mind becomes a product of the tasks it performs and the technological resources it exploits, i.e. how it becomes technologized in ways not necessarily beneficial to the humans themselves. af Gorayska and Lindsay ([ 18, 43] ), who postulated that the ways in which people structure their habitats have major influence on which cognitive mechanisms may operate inside of those habitats. In their paper they conjectured that structured habitats are extemalizations af human memory which serve two major purposes: they facilitate simple but sufficient algorithms for dealing with the complexities of the material world; at the same time they act as reminders fbr intention directed behavior.
That is, the spatial and organizational relations between objects present in those habitats dictate which goals are to be pursued and which plans-action sets will effectively achieve them. It follows fiom the Fabricated World Hypothesis that, if the human mind and the extemal world are interrelated in intricate and inseparable ways, the structure given to the human fabricated environment must have a profound influence on the organization of the mind. This thesis has since become one of the major areas for explorations in CT ( [24] )
We speculate that the orientation cf human habitats towards hnctional goals supports people in the generation and recovery of problem spaces which comprise elements interconnected by relevance relationships ([ 181, [ 191, [2 I]). The cognitive mechanism fbr processing relevance relationships, (conceptualized as a relevance metafunction) provides an interface between motivation, situation, and action systems (cf. [35] ). It is understood to be responsible for goveming how unconscious motivation is cognized, how extemal situations are perceived, and how effectively our sensori-motor movements are integrated with these two seemingly independent contexts.
The processing of relevance is closely linked to the phenomena of attention and extemal priming ( [22] ).
Attention and external priming are dnven by both linguistic and nonlinguistic communication. When communicating, people perform pragmatic acts ([5 l] ), i.e. they purposely set up scenarios which increase the probability of some intended events -the so called 'take ups' by targeted participants in a dialogue -to occur.
Pragmatic acts are therefore a behavioral equivalent of the fabrication of extemal reality. The analogy can be further extended to include natural language as a spontaneously evolving technology which extemalizes the mind, amplifying and, at the same time, constraining its intemal operations ( [25] , [27] , [42] , [29] ).
Within psychology, two frameworks have been proposed which are pertinent to the above issues: Ecological Perception ([ 121) and Symbol Grounding ( [30] ). With respect to the former, Gibson argued that within a perceivable extemal reality only a finite set of experiences are possible. He conceived that human perception involves two interrelated processes: recognition of the invariant properties of objects in unstable environments and recognition of the actions these objects can afford However, he claimed that it is possible to understand human perception without considering linguistic and cultural mediation. Hence, he rejected any link between perception and mental representation, postulating that mentation is purely reactive and occurs as a direct exposure of the mind to its environment.
Hamad [30] 
The affordance activation problem
Highly dynamic environments rely on invaria characteristics which are perceived as constant. Accordii to Gibson, We believe that the extemal world provides only potential for affordance (cf. [ 1 13); that affordance is neitk unique nor complete. Mordance potential also exists individual perceiving agents. Upon contact with t &ordance potential in the environment the affordar potential in the individual perceiving agents reifies t affordance. This leads to the construction of a meaning action trigger. Action, in tum, has a recursive &xt motivational states and the environment. The affordar activation problem is thus an instance of how relevar relations (comprising fine tuned complexes of goa actions, and perceived objects) come to be determini intemalized, recursively modified, and extemalized living organisms in order to ensure their self-regulati equilibria.
Let's go back for one moment to the relevance me function that we introduced earlier. And let's supp' M e r that we indeed are able to define and handle an archetypal relevance meta-function, both conceptually and procedurally. That would mean that we could establish the relevance of the internal processes that steer motivational states and environments, as well as the necessary interaction between the two, and that furthermore, we are able to procedurally determine the vectors controlling those processes.
The question then arises: Doing this, have we established a working C T model? Vice versa, will this conceptual arrangement affect our vision of C T, and how? Will it become fruitful for tool design? And so on.
In particular, the question needs to be raised whether such knowledge, combined with its applications, will allow us to answer some important empirical questions, such as the ones listed below (see also [28] ):
1. 
2.
3.
4.
It goes without saying that the notion d relevance as discussed here, cannot properly be situated in a societal context without appealing to concepts such as control ( 
